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Abstract
This paper investigates the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks in an
estimated dynamic general equilibrium model. I construct a New Keynesian model with dis-
tortionary labour and capital taxes and with preferences that allow the wealth effect on labour
supply to vary in strength. I show that the interaction of these two features crucially affects the
response of the economy to a government spending shock. The model’s parameters are there-
fore estimated (including the tax policy rules) for the United States. I show that the estimated
model can match the positive empirical response of key variables including output, consumption
and the real wage — a challenge for many New Keynesian models. I find that the estimated im-
portance of the wealth effect is small; that sticky prices, variable capital utilisation, investment
adjustment costs and habits all play an important role; and that whilst tax rates rise following
the shock, their small magnitude crucially reduces the distortions involved.
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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of government spending in stimulating the economy became a central policy ques-
tion during the 2008 financial crisis. Whilst proponents and critics argued about the mechanisms
determining policy success, it has been often noted that standard macroeconomic models can gen-
erate a wide range of theoretical predictions depending on the assumptions made about how the
spending increase is financed1 and assumptions about how consumers respond to implied future
tax increases.
In this paper I construct and estimate a New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model
focusing on the endogenous response of tax rates to government spending shocks and the strength
of the so-called ‘wealth effect’ on labour supply — both of which are shown to crucially affect the
predictions of standard macroeconomic models. This paper therefore contributes directly to the
literature on the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks. The model is shown to
match key aspects of the empirical evidence with a realistic set of tax instruments and transmission
channels.
For all their complexity, many standard models of fiscal policy often rely on a very simple fiscal
policy instrument, the lump sum tax, to finance an expenditure shock. This includes state of the
art policy models such as that of Smets and Wouters (2007) and recent papers, for example by
Cogan et al. (2009), who analyse the size of fiscal multipliers in the U.S.
However, the lump sum tax assumption is far from innocuous. Lump sum tax-finance implies a
‘wealth’ effect as (expected) income falls. Consumption falls but, assuming leisure and consumption
are normal goods, labour supply and consequently output rise. This allows the neoclassical model,
and others based on it, to match empirical evidence that GDP increases following a discretionary
government spending stimulus.
There are, however, several issues with this mechanism. Firstly, the output rise relies both on
the strength of the wealth effect and the lack of distortions associated with the instrument. Consider
using a labour income tax instead. The labour supply decision is now distorted, producing strong
negative substitution effects. Generally this substitution effect dominates, lowering labour supply
and output. Secondly, even if the wealth effect channel can explain the output response, it generates
consumption and the real wage responses that are at odds with the empirical Structural Vector
Autoregression (SVAR) literature.2 Thirdly, there is the practical realism of the assumption. Lump
1See, for example, Baxter and King (1993) or Alesina et al. (2002).
2For example see Perotti (2007) for a review of this evidence. Papers employing the narrative approach to
identification sometimes find a fall in consumption. Perotti (2007) shows that this is largely due to the Korean War.
2
sum taxes are rarely, if ever, used as primary instruments of tax policy. Cloyne (2011) and Romer
and Romer (2010) illustrate that most tax actions in the U.K. and U.S. respectively were changes
in distortionary taxes.3
Since there is no a priori reason to assume that a particular mix of tax instruments finances a
spending increase, my first goal in this paper is to estimate the endogenous response of tax rates
for the United States and construct a New Keynesian model which replicates these.
The second goal is then to examine the strength of the wealth effect on labour supply itself.
The wealth effect channel is still potentially important even after modelling and estimating the
distortionary tax rules. This is because the government’s budget constraint must hold each period.
In several models (such as Burnside et al. (2004)), this is done using a lump sum tax. Furthermore,
even if the budget constraint is satisfied by issuing debt, Ricardian equivalence with respect to
lump sum taxes implies the same wealth effect on labour supply. It is therefore important to jointly
consider the strength of the wealth effect on labour supply and the endogenous tax responses to
the spending shock.
Following Monacelli and Perotti (2009), I use Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) (JR) preferences
which allow for a variable wealth effect on labour supply. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2010) (who do not investigate fiscal policy issues), I estimate the size of this effect. As shown by
Monacelli and Perotti, a useful feature of these preferences is that, when the wealth effect on labour
supply is limited, consumption and the real wage can increase. This further motivates estimating
the importance of the channel.
To evaluate the importance of other potential transmission mechanisms I include a range of
more standard features such as sticky prices, variable capital utilisation and habits. I show that
the estimated model can match the positive empirical response of key variables including output,
consumption and the real wage, which is a challenge for many New Keynesian models. These results
arise for a number of reasons. Firstly, the importance of the wealth effect on labour supply is small.
Secondly, mechanisms such as sticky prices, variable capital utilisation, investment adjustment costs
and habits all play an important role in matching the evidence. Thirdly, distortionary tax rates
rise following the expenditure shock but their small magnitude crucially reduces the distortions
involved. This explains why the positive output and consumption responses prevail.
The results in this paper contribute, and are related, to several branches of the current lit-
erature. First, I directly contribute to the literature which seeks to explain the empirical effects
3This includes, for example, both tax changes to directly fund spending measures and tax changes to deal with a
budget deficit.
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of discretionary shocks to government expenditure. In recent years, work has been focused on
matching the sign of the consumption (and real wage) response — see, for example, Monacelli and
Perotti (2009), Ravn et al. (2007),4 Linnemann and Schabert (2003). Few papers in this specific
branch of the literature have considered distortionary taxes or included empirically realistic tax
policy rules (Burnside et al. (2004) is one exception and Reis (2008) who explicitly argues that it is
necessary). To my knowledge, no papers have empirically evaluated the importance of the wealth
effect channel as a transmission mechanism of fiscal policy.5
Secondly, by estimating tax policy rules, the results in this paper have a relationship with the
wider literature estimating different fiscal policy rules. For example, both Leeper et al. (2010) and
Zubairy (2010) perform Bayesian estimation of DSGE models that include feedback rules for tax
rates from output and debt (but not spending). However, Leeper et al. (2010) does not focus on the
effects of spending shocks and Zubairy (2010) is more concerned with estimating fiscal multipliers
using a DSGE model rather than matching other empirical evidence on the effects of spending
shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 estimates the empirical effects
of government spending shocks using a SVAR. Section 3 sets up the theoretical model. Section
4 illustrates key features of the model with respect to the tax policy rules and their interaction
with the wealth effect channel. Section 5 estimates the model using a minimum distance estimator.
Section 6 concludes that the estimated model matches the empirical evidence well, that shocks
appear largely debt-financed, that the wealth effect is relatively small and that sticky prices play
an important role, as do the other common mechanisms.
2 The empirical effects of fiscal policy
2.1 Identification
The parameters of the model will be chosen to match the estimated empirical impulse response
functions. The empirical effects of a government spending shock are identified using the method of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Consider the following reduced form VAR:
Xt = α0 + α1t+B(L)Xt−1 + ut. (1)
4Zubairy (2009), as I do, follows a minimum distance approach, estimating how well a ‘deep habits’ model of the
form of Ravn et al. (2007) (with lump sum taxes) can explain a government spending shock.
5Although, as noted above, Monacelli and Perotti (2009) do show how varying the strength of this effect has useful
implications.
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X = [gt τ
k τn y c n w i b]′ where g is government spending, τk capital taxes, τn labour taxes,
y output, c consumption, n employment, w the real wage and i investment. For later reference, I
also include government debt, b. B(L) is a lag polynomial of order P .
The reduced form residuals ut are likely to be correlated. For example, a shock to government
spending is likely to imply contemporaneous effects on taxes, debt and so on. Pre-multiplying (1)
by the square matrix A (and ignoring the constant and trend for presentation) yields:
AXt = AB(L)Xt−1 + et (2)
where Aut = et and et are the structural shocks.
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Identification proceeds by making assumptions about the contemporaneous correlation between
variables. Identification is achieved by restricting n(n − 1)/2 parameters. The Blanchard–Perotti
assumptions justify certain restrictions. The key assumption is that policy decision variables are
unaffected contemporaneously (within the same quarter) by changes in the other endogenous vari-
ables. This is justified by the institutional delays involved in policy decision-making. It is therefore
assumed that government spending is not affected contemporaneously by any other variable.
The original Blanchard–Perotti approach made use of tax revenues as the measure of taxes, from
which they had to work out how much of the change in revenues was due to cyclical movements (in
income, for example) and how much was due to genuine policy shocks. External information on tax
elasticities was used to disentangle the two effects. In my empirical setup I follow Perotti (2007)
and directly construct, and use, tax rates so that the theoretical model’s policy rules can be directly
estimated. The consequence of using rates rather than revenues is that they are policy decision
variables. Under the Blanchard–Perotti timing assumptions, these should also be unaffected by
other endogenous variables within the quarter. However, I allow them to be affected by spending
(in other words, I assume that spending decisions are taken first and then taxes can respond).
To illustrate the identification scheme, consider a smaller set of variables: government spending
g, a distortionary tax rate τ , a non-fiscal variable such as output or consumption, y, and debt, b.
The relationship between the reduced form residuals and the structural shocks can be written as:
6Sometimes this is written as Aut = Bet. I am therefore assuming B = I, which is common. It is worth
noting that assumptions on A will replicate having some non-zero off-diagonal elements in B. Since I only consider
structural government spending shocks, all other elements of et will be 0 and only the first column of B is relevant.
Suppose that the second element of this column was non-zero. This would imply that the structural government
spending shock affects the tax (where tax is the second equation) reduced form residual. However, since ug = eg by
the Blanchard–Perotti timing assumptions, nothing is lost by setting this element of B to zero but ensuring that the
relevant element of A, the effect of ug on other elements of ut, is correctly accounted for.
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
1 −αgτ −αgy −αgb
−ατg 1 −ατy −ατb
−αyg −αyτ 1 −αyb
−αbg −αbτ −αby 1
 =

ugt
uτt
uyt
ubt
 =

egt
eτt
eyt
ebt
 (3)
The timing assumptions discussed above allow us to set αgτ = αgy = αgb = ατy = ατb = 0.
However, it seems reasonable to assume that taxes, output and debt may respond to the structural
spending shock. Output and debt may also respond to taxes contemporaneously.
In the example above, these assumptions leave us one restriction short. We need to restrict
either αyb or αby. With the variable ordering above, setting αyb = 0 implies a lower triangular
matrix for A. Following Perotti (2007) I adopt this procedure. The most contentious assumption
is therefore that debt is ordered last. Ordering the debt series last implies that debt has no
contemporaneous effect on output within the quarter (or that the level of debt in period t is the
outcome of the changes to the other variables and not the other way around). Ordering debt
before output assumes that output has no effect on debt (αby = 0) within the quarter. The latter
assumption here would appear unrealistic and so I opt for the former specification.7
2.2 The data
The data are for the United States over the period 1955:1 to 2007:4. I exclude the Korean War
because it is, to some extent, a unique event and can disproportionately drive the results (see
Perotti (2007)).
With the exception of the tax rates and debt, all data are taken directly from the relevant
sources (and appropriately deflated). The tax rates are constructed using the method outlined in
Jones (2002). This approach is also adopted by Burnside et al. (2004).
The debt series would ideally be ‘Debt Held by the Public’, as used by Favero and Giavazzi
(2007). However, this quarterly series does not go back far enough. I therefore construct a debt
series from old editions of the U.S. Treasury Bulletin. The resulting series is very close to ‘Debt
Held by the Public’, see Appendix A for details. This improves on the Favero–Giavazzi method of
simulating the debt series back to 1947 using annual data.
7In the full specification I tested alternative variable orderings. Not placing debt last, despite the above discussion,
generated identical impulse response functions to three decimal places, with the standard errors only marginally
affected. I switched the two tax rates around and this made little difference. I also used different combinations of
the non-fiscal variables (which all appear in place of y in the shorter example), again with very little effect.
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All variables, except the tax rates, are the log of real per capita variables. The tax rates are
percentages. All real series are the nominal series deflated by its own implicit price deflator, with
the exception of government spending and debt which are deflated by the GDP deflator. Appendix
A sets out the specific details of each series.
2.3 Results
The figures below report the baseline results for P = 4. The impulse response functions are
simulations to a one percent structural shock to government spending. The point estimates are
shown together with standard 68 percent non-parametric bootstrapped confidence intervals using
10,000 replications.
Figure 1 shows the response of the fiscal policy variables to the shock. The response of the
labour and capital tax rates, although positive (as one might expect) are relatively modest.8 Given
the modest increase in taxes, it is useful to consider the response of debt. To the extent that lump
sum taxes are rarely used to satisfy the government budget constraint, modest tax rate increases
would imply a larger increase in debt. This is what is observed in the fourth panel of figure 1.
Figure 2 shows the responses of the other variables in the SVAR. The top two panels show the
familiar SVAR result that output and consumption rise following a government spending shock.
The output response on impact is 0.224. Note that this is log yt − log y and log gt − log g = 1 by
definition. This means that the ratio of the percentage deviations can be written as ∆yt∆gt
g
y . The
multiplier, ∆yt∆gt , is therefore the product of this ratio and average government spending to GDP
( gy ), which is 0.22 in the sample. These estimates imply an output multiplier of about one.
Consumption exhibits the hump-shaped response often seen in SVAR results. Interestingly the
labour market responses are weaker, although the point estimates are generally still positive. The
investment response is generally negative, again a feature often found in other SVAR studies. For
comparable findings see, among others, Perotti (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2009).
3 The model
To directly address the issues raised earlier, the model includes distortionary capital and labour tax
rates, allowing for endogenous tax rate responses to government spending shocks. I also employ
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preferences which allow the strength of the wealth effect on labour
supply to vary. Finally, the model includes a range of more standard features such as sticky prices,
8These responses are very similar including and excluding the debt series.
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variable capital utilisation and habits.
3.1 Households
Households derive utility from consumption (C) and leisure (1 − N). The household maximises
lifetime utility
max
Ct,Nt,It,zt,Kt+1,Bt+1
Et
∞∑
t=s
βt−su(Ct+s, 1−Nt+s), (4)
subject to a budget constraint (in real terms)
Ct + It +
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt + wtNt(1− τNt ) + rKt (zt)(1− τKt )Kt − Tt. (5)
The capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ(zt))Kt + It
(
1− φ
(
It
It−1
− 1
))
, (6)
which incorporates adjustment costs employed by Christiano et al. (2005), among others. The
utility function, u : R2 → R, is assumed to be concave and twice continuously differentiable. The
function φ satisfies φ = φ′ = 0 and φ′′ > 0.
Kt+1 denotes capital held by households at the end of period t and Bt+1 are real holdings of
government bonds, also at the end of period t. Ct is consumption, It is investment, Rt is the
aggregate real interest rate (gross), wt is the aggregate real wage and r
K
t is the real return on
capital. τKt and τ
N
t are the tax rates on capital and labour income respectively. Tt are lump sum
taxes. δ is the rate of depreciation.
The parametric specification for the utility function u(·) follows Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) and Monacelli and Perotti (2009).
U(Ct, Nt) =
(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)1−σ
1− σ (7)
where
Xt = (Ct − hC˜t−1)γX1−γt−1 . (8)
For γ = 1 and h = 0 these preferences become those considered by King et al. (1988). For γ = 0
and h = 0 they become the preferences considered by Greenwood et al. (1988) (henceforth GHH).9
9One reason against simply using GHH preferences is that they fail to satisfy the conditions for balanced growth,
see King and Rebelo (1999) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).
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The latter preferences exhibit no wealth effect on labour supply. In other words, labour supply is
solely affected by the real wage (net of taxes) and not by the level of consumption.
I have modified the Jaimovich–Rebelo preferences to include habits. C˜t−1 is aggregate con-
sumption in the previous period and the consumer takes this as given. Below I show that internal
habits, where consumers explicitly consider Ct−1 in their optimisation decisions, would reintroduce
the wealth effect on labour supply when γ = 0.
The model also features variable capital utilisation. High utilisation by firms implies greater de-
preciation of a given stock of capital. For this reason both the return on capital and the depreciation
are functions of utilisation, captured by the variable zt.
3.1.1 First order conditions
The first order conditions for the household’s problem, with respect to Ct, Xt, Bt+1, Nt, It, Kt+1
and zt are:
λt = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ + µtγ(Ct − hC˜t−1)γ−1X1−γt−1 (9)
(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σψN ξt + µt = βEt(µt+1(1− γ)(Ct − hC˜t−1)γX−γt (10)
Et
(
λt+1
λt
)
=
1
Rtβ
(11)
ψN ξ−1t ξXt(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ = λtwt(1− τnt ) (12)
1− qt
((
1− φ
(
It
It−1
))
− φ′
(
It
It−1
)(
It
It−1
))
= Et
(
qt+1
λt+1
λt
β
[
I2t+1
I2t
φ′
(
It+1
It
)])
(13)
qt = βEt
λt+1
λt
(
rKt+1(1− τKt+1) + qt+1(1− δ(zt))
)
(14)
r′Kt (zt) = qtδ
′(zt) (15)
where r′K is the derivative of the return on capital with respect to utilisation. µt is the Lagrange
multiplier on the evolution of Xt (equation (8)) and qt is the multiplier on the capital accumulation
equation and reflects Tobin’s marginal q.
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3.1.2 The variable wealth effect
Consider the extreme case where γ = 0. The preferences are then of the GHH-form and the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is independent of consumption. To
see this, combine the first order condition with respect to consumption with the first order condition
with respect to labour supply:
ψN ξ−1t ξXt(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σwt(1− τnt ) (16)
noting
λt = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ. (17)
This implies that
ψξN ξ−1t = wt(1− τnt ). (18)
At an unchanged real wage and tax rate, hours do not change. In a simple graphical repre-
sentation without capital, this implies that the labour supply curve does not shift outwards as
consumption falls (the key neoclassical channel, raising labour supply and lowering the real wage
following an increase in lump sum taxes). Under Jaimovich–Rebelo preferences, increasing γ from
zero raises the strength of the wealth effect on labour supply.
3.1.3 Habits and the wealth effect
An important feature of the preferences is the lack of wealth effect on labour supply as γ tends
towards zero. This feature is preserved under the habits specification introduced above. To see
this consider again equation (16). This was obtained because the marginal utility of consumption
is equal to λt, cancelling on both sides of equation (16). Note that this would not be true with
internal habits. For γ = 0, λt would be:
λt = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξt )−σ − Etλt+1hβ(Ct+1 − hC˜t − ψN ξt+1)−σ. (19)
The first order condition for labour supply is unchanged. λt no longer cancels in equation (16) and
labour supply once again depends on consumption.
3.2 Firms
There are a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing final output indexed on
the unit interval. The consumer’s problem can still be formulated as above but note that each
10
individual actually purchases a bundle of differentiated goods
∫ 1
0 Pt(i)Ct(i) where i refers to a
particular firm. For each variety of goods the consumption demand function is:
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Ct, (20)
where
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−di
) 1
1−
(21)
and  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods.
The minimum expenditure required to purchase a bundle of goods resulting in Ct units of the
composite good is given by PtCt and so the consumer’s budget constraint can be written as before.
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The demand for the ith product (the output of firm i) is given by
Yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−
Y dt , (22)
where Y dt is aggregate demand. The resource constraint is
Yt = Ct + It +Gt. (23)
Cost minimization with respect to Nt(i), Kt(i) and zt(i) subject to firm i’s production function
Yt(i) = [zt(i)Kt(i)]
αNt(i)
(1−α) implies
wt = mct(i)(1− α) Yt(i)
Nt(i)
(24)
rKt = mct(i)α
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
, (25)
and
mct(i)α
Yt(i)
zt(i)
=
qtδ
′(zt(i))kt(i)
(1− τKt )
(26)
where mct(i) is real marginal cost and equation (26) makes use of equation (15).
When firms are able to reset their price they choose P ∗t (i) to maximize expected profits
maxEt
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+j
[
(1− τP )P ∗t+j(i)Yt+j(i)−MCt+s(i)Yt+s(i) + TPt+j
]
(27)
subject to
Yt+j(i) =
(
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
)−
Y dt+j ,
where MCt is nominal marginal cost. τ
P and TP are a tax and lump sum subsidy, which removes
the steady state markup distortion.
10The consumer’s problem technically also includes non-zero profits Πt which I assume are equally distributed lump
sum to all consumers. This does not affect the first order conditions.
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The first order condition for firm i’s price setting problem is the familiar New Keynesian optimal
reset price:
P ∗t (i) =
Et
∑∞
j=0 η
jQt,t+jMCt+1Yt+j(i)
Et
∑∞
j=0 η
jQt,t+jYt+j(i)
. (28)
Finally, the price index is an aggregate of firms who reset their price today and those who must
retain last period’s prices
Pt =
[
ηP 1−t−1 + (1− η)P ∗(1−)t
] 1
1−
. (29)
3.3 Government
The government can finance spending, G, through a mixture of bond supply B, labour and capital
income taxes τN , τK or lump sum taxes T , such that the government budget constraint is satisfied
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt +Gt − τNt Ntwt − τKt KtrKt − Tt. (30)
Tax rules are necessary to specify how the government splits its financing between the various
tax instruments. I assume tax rates respond to a proportion of the spending increase. Writing τˆ
as the percentage point deviation from steady state, and all other lower case letters as percentage
deviation from steady state, the tax rules for the linearized model are of the form:
τˆNt = θ
τN ,1τˆNt−1 + θ
τN ,2τˆNt−2 + θ
nggt (31)
τˆKt = θ
τK ,1τˆKt−1 + θ
τK ,2τˆKt−2 + θ
kggt (32)
I follow Reis (2008) in making government spending ARMA(1,1)
gt = φ1gt−1 + φ2at, (33)
where at is an AR(1) process with a white noise shock and the persistence is governed by parameter
ρ.
3.4 Monetary policy
Monetary policy follows a simple rule relating the nominal interest rate (nomit) to inflation. In
percentage deviations from steady state (linearized form), and using the Fisher relation, the real
interest rate is related to inflation by
12
nomit = rt − Etpit+1 = φpipit. (34)
where φpi > 1.
3.5 Equilibrium and model solution
The equilibrium is defined by an allocation {Kt, Ct, Nt, Yt, Bt, It, zt, Xt}∞t=0, a price system
{wt, Rt, qt, rkt , Pt(i), Pt,mct, λt, µt)}∞t=0, a fiscal policy {τNt , τKt , Gt}∞t=0 and an exogenous process
{at}∞t=0 such that the allocation {Kt, Ct, Nt, Yt, Bt, It, zt, Xt}∞t=0 solves:
1. the households’ problem, maximizing (4) subject to (5), (6), (8) and a no-ponzi condition,
given prices, thus satisfying (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15);
2. the firms’ problem (27) subject to (22) and minimizing costs so that equations (24), (25),
(26), (28) and (29) are satisfied.
3. All markets clear and equations (30), (31), (32), (33) and (34) and the resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It +Gt are satisfied.
The equilibrium system is therefore defined by equations (6), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14),
(15), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), the production function, the aggregates of equations
(24), (25) and (26) and an exogenous process for at+1 = ρat + εt+1. The set of predetermined
variables is {Bt,Kt, at}.
The model is linearized around a deterministic steady state where all firms set the same price.
The collection of linearized conditions can be written in recursive form:
AEt
 xt+1
yt+1
 = B
 xt
yt
 (35)
where x is the vector of state variables, xt+1 = {kt+1, bt+1, at+1}. y is the vector of control variables.
The solution to this linear rational expectations model is then of the form:
yt = Qxt (36)
xt+1 = Pxt. (37)
To solve for matrices P and Q in the policy functions, I employ the Klein (2000) algorithm solab.
Details of the linearized system and the steady state are given in the Appendices B and C
respectively. Of particular interest are the linearized equations governing price evolution, utilisation
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and investment (recall, lower case letters represent percentage deviations from steady state). The
first is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Note that the degree of price stickiness, η, appears in
this expression and will be estimated.
pit =
(1− βη)(1− η)
η
mct + βEtpit+1. (38)
The degree of capital utilisation, zt, is described by
(1 + κ)zt = yt − kt − qt +mct − τKt
1
1− τK , (39)
where κ = δ
′′
δ′ is the elasticity of depreciation to utilisation, and will also be estimated. Investment
evolves according to
qt
φ′′
= (1 + β)it − it−1 − βEtit+1 (40)
and 1φ′′ = µ will be estimated.
4 Key features of the model
In this section I consider some important mechanisms in the model. Before considering how the
choice of tax policy instruments affect the results, I first consider how the model’s more standard
features interact with the strength of the wealth effect on labour supply under lump sum taxes.
Table 1 presents the initial baseline calibration for this section.
4.1 The strength of the wealth effect on labour supply
Figures (3) to (7) illustrate the effect of turning on each mechanism one at a time while still
assuming that lump sum taxes fund the spending shock.
In Figure (3), the model has flexible prices (η = 0), no variable capital utilisation (κ =∞) and
no habit formation (h = 0). γ = 1, so there is a standard wealth effect on labour supply. This case
can therefore be regarded as a simple baseline neoclassical model. Figure (3) shows the familiar
neoclassical result. The higher lump sum taxes that accompany the spending shock lower lifetime
wealth, lower consumption, lower savings and hence investment, but boost labour supply. The real
wage therefore falls. Figure (4), however, illustrates the effect of turning off the wealth effect on
labour supply, i.e. setting γ = 0. Labour supply now does not respond to the lower lifetime wealth.
Consumption and investment are lower than before, reflecting the decrease in lifetime wealth and
the lack of increased earnings from supplying more labour. All these forces cause output to fall
over time. Importantly, the neoclassical model can no longer match the empirical output response.
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In fact the neoclassical model without a wealth effect on labour supply fails to qualitatively match
any of the output, consumption, real wage or hours responses estimated in section 2.
It is worth emphasising that if the shock were funded with debt rather than lump sum taxes,
Ricardian equivalence implies that the result will be the same. To the extent that governments
rarely, if ever, use lump sum taxes (Cloyne (2011) and the associated long appendix documents this
for the United Kingdom and see Romer and Romer (2010) for the U.S.), increased borrowing will
be needed to satisfy the government’s budget constraint (assuming no distortionray taxes). It is
therefore an important empirical question whether debt-finance — which raises expectations about
future tax increases — generates a wealth effect on labour supply today.
Figure (5) shows the result of adding sticky prices to the previous model (γ = 0). As Figure (5)
illustrates, government spending now has a positive effect on demand which boosts output, labour
demand (and hence hours), the real wage, hours worked and consumption. The figure illustrates
the Monacelli and Perotti (2009) result that consumption can rise following the shock. Two features
of the model produce this result. Firstly, there is no wealth effect on labour supply. This means
that the real wage does not fall on impact because the labour supply curve does not shift with
the increase in the marginal utility of wealth. Secondly, in response to the shock, the sticky price
demand effect induces an outward shift of the labour demand curve. For sufficiently sticky prices
the result is a rise in the real wage and hours — raising income enough that consumption also
increases. This effect lowers the amount of dis-saving, lessening the negative effect on investment.
Adding variable capital utilisation to the model serves to increase the persistence of these effects,
as can be seen from figure (6). Finally, the inclusion of habits adds persistence to the consumption
profile, with additional implications for overall demand. This can be seen from figure (7).
This section has shown that all the mechanisms in the model interact to produce positive
consumption, output, real wage and hours responses, as found empirically in section 2, when the
wealth effect on labour supply is small enough. This contrasts with the standard neoclassical model.
The empirical relevance of the wealth effect on labour supply is therefore of great importance.
4.2 The effect of different tax instruments
The previous section illustrated the importance of the wealth effect on labour supply under lump
sum taxes. This section now evaluates the effect of adding distortionary taxes to the model and
explores varying the tax instruments used to finance the shock.
In the above examples, by using lump sum taxes, there were no substitution effects. This is
not true when distortionary taxes finance the spending shock. Figure (8) illustrates the effect
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of assuming that the two distortionary tax rates increase following the spending shock. For this
exercise I arbitrarily choose θgn = θgk = 0.6. The figure illustrates the strong negative effect on
output and consumption of using distortionary taxes. In short, the results in the previous section
depend not only on the strength of the wealth effect on labour supply, but also — quite dramatically
— on the instruments used to finance the shock. I now consider the two types of taxes individually.
4.2.1 Labour income taxes
Consider the supply side effects of a rise in the labour income tax rate. There are two substitution
effects. First, the intra-temporal decision is distorted and labour supply falls. In other words,
it is more costly to supply labour today as the worker pays higher taxes per hour. Second, the
inter-temporal decision is distorted if the tax rate is changing over time (as it may be when the tax
rules are estimated). For a rising (falling) tax profile the worker may still prefer (dislike) to work
today as it will be relatively less (more) costly than tomorrow. These substitution effects work to
offset the wealth effect on labour supply. In the simulations below, labour supply falls considerably
following a rise in government spending.
To illustrate the effect, I calibrate the coefficient on gt in the labour tax rule to be 0.95, leaving
the equivalent parameter zero in the capital tax rule. Figure 9 shows the strong negative effect of
this change in the tax policy rule. The positive effects on output, consumption and hours in the
previous section are now reversed in the presence of labour income tax-finance. Note that saving
becomes more attractive which, over time, raises investment.
4.2.2 Capital income taxes
Figure 10 shows the effect of calibrating the coefficient on gt in the capital tax rate rule to 0.95,
leaving the equivalent coefficient zero in the labour tax rule.
Interestingly, the use of capital taxes raises consumption and output on impact but lowers the
persistence. This effect is a combination of substitution effects and sticky prices (and habits).
Taxing capital makes consumption relatively more attractive than saving. As a result, ceteris
paribus, the balance between consumption and saving tilts towards consumption. This increase in
demand, given sticky prices, boosts output in the short run. With flexible prices the increase in
capital taxes tends to lower consumption and output as the capital stock declines.
Another key determinant of the size of this response is the presence of capital adjustment costs.
The distortions introduced by taxing capital are not fully felt immediately but become apparent
over time as the capital stock adjusts. This explains the decline in output over time.
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4.2.3 Summary
The previous subsections have analysed the interactions between debt finance/lump sum taxes, the
use of distortionary taxes and the wealth effect channel. Debt finance (or lump sum taxes) minimizes
the contemporaneous distortions associated with labour and capital taxes. Labour income taxes
produce a strong negative effect on all the key variables. If the objective is a stimulus to output
(rather than a concern with welfare), this suggests labour income taxes should be avoided. The
use of capital income taxes may raise the impact stimulus by boosting consumption but will lower
the persistence of the effect on output as the capital stock declines faster.
I also showed that under debt-finance (or lump sum taxes) the model’s predictions rest on the
strength of the wealth effect on labour supply and the degree of price stickiness (and, to a lesser
extent, habits and variable capital utilisation, which reinforce the results). A low degree of wealth
effect on labour supply allows the sticky price effects to jointly raise output, consumption, the real
wage and hours. However, for stronger degrees of wealth effect, consumption will fall. Conversely,
if the wealth effect is small, but prices are flexible, output and consumption both fall.
In short, this section has shown that the choice of tax policy instruments matters, as does the
strength of the wealth effect on labour supply. In fact, the model’s results are highly dependent
on these parameters. However, there is no a priori reason to calibrate either the tax policy rules
in a particular way, or to assume a particular strength of wealth effect on labour supply. To
properly evaluate the ability of the model to explain the effects of a government spending shock,
arbitrarily calibrating these key parameters will not be enlightening. Estimation is therefore the
most appropriate strategy to follow.
5 Estimation
I estimate the model using a minimum distance approach as discussed by, for example, Christiano
et al. (2005). Key parameters of the model are chosen to minimize the distance between the model’s
impulse responses and the empirical impulse responses.
The model’s parameters are partitioned into two blocks. The first block includes a set of
parameters which are calibrated. The second block includes parameters to be estimated. I estimate
all the parameters of the fiscal policy rules. I also estimate the parameters of the key mechanisms
in the model: γ governing the size of the wealth effect, κ determining the degree of variable
capital utilisation, µ determining the strength of the investment adjustment costs, η the degree of
price stickiness and the habit persistence parameter h. The parameter vector to be estimated is
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therefore11
ζ = [φ1 φ2 θ
gn θn1 θn2 θgk θk1 θk2 η κ γ h µ].
Let the empirical impulse responses be stacked in a vector x¯. The model produces impulse
responses conditional on a set of parameters. Let the parameter vector be ζ as above. Let the
output of the model given the set of parameters be x(ζ). The objective is to choose parameters to
minimize the loss function
ζ = arg min
ζ
[x¯− x(ζ)]V −1[x¯− x(ζ)]′, (41)
where V is a weighting matrix which includes the variances of the empirical impulses along the
diagonal and zeros elsewhere. The purpose of this matrix is to down-weight observations with
larger standard errors. As such, I ensure that the estimated model’s responses lie as far inside the
empirical confidence intervals as possible.
I match the model’s impulse responses to the first 16 periods of the nine empirical impulse
responses. Dropping any observation with zero variance from the loss function (the first element
of the government spending series) leaves the x vectors ((9 × 16) − 1) × 1 and the V matrix
((9× 16)− 1)× ((9× 16)− 1) in dimension.
The standard errors are calculated following Hall et al. (2010). Specifically the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is found as the solution to:
Vζ =
[
∂x(ζ)
∂ζ
′
W−1
∂x(ζ)
∂ζ
]−1
(42)
where W is the variance-covariance matrix of the impulse response functions and ∂x(ζ)∂ζ is the
((9 × 16) − 1) × 9 Jacobian of the theoretical impulse responses with respect to the parameter
vector.
5.1 Results
The estimated parameter values are given in table (2). The tax rate responses to the government
spending shock are estimated to be small, although the response builds over time — as can be seen
from the coefficients on the lagged tax rates. Figure 11 displays the matched policy responses im-
plied by the estimated model, together with the confidence intervals from the SVAR. The estimated
fiscal policy parameters in table (2) generate responses within the empirical confidence intervals
and are thus a decent replication of the empirical policy response. For reference, I also plot the
11For a list of parameter definitions see table 1.
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simulated debt path from the model given the spending and tax rate changes. Interestingly, based
on the model’s estimated parameters, these tax rate changes are consistent with the empirically
estimated response of debt from section 2. This suggests that spending shocks are typically funded
more through debt than through contemporary tax changes.
Table 2 also reports the other estimated parameter values and their standard errors. It is worth
comparing these with values discussed elsewhere. King and Rebelo (1999) take κ ∈ [0.1,∞] and the
value in table 2 is close to the value of 0.15 used by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). η is of the order
of magnitude usually used in New Keynesian models and is similar to the value of 0.83 estimated
by Altig et al. (2004). It is, however, slightly too high, which may suggest other amplification
mechanisms could be included in the model to lower the required degree of price stickiness. The
estimate for γ implies a very small wealth effect on labour supply and not statistically significant
from zero. This reinforces the results of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010). h is similar to the value
of 0.7 used by Monacelli and Perotti (2009) and is a fairly standard figure found in the wider
literature.
Figure 12 displays the responses of the other key macroeconomic variables. Again, the esti-
mated model produces responses largely within the confidence intervals. It is noteworthy that the
estimated model jointly replicates the output and consumption responses, which is often a problem
for New Keynesian models. Although the hours response is slightly too strong, most of the real
wage response is well matched. The investment response is too shallow to start with and too strong
over time; however this reflects the investment adjustment cost mechanism. The parameter less
well estimated is µ, which governs the investment adjustment costs. The estimate is well below
the value of 1/8 estimated by Mertens and Ravn (2011), which itself is lower than in other studies.
However, raising the value of µ would produce too great a decline in investment. All this sug-
gests interesting scope for considering more complicated investment dynamics in the transmission
of fiscal shocks.
5.2 Robustness
I now examine the robustness of the parameter estimates when each of the main mechanisms
discussed earlier are turned off or directly calibrated.12 Table (3) displays the results from these
experiments.
First consider the fiscal policy parameters. Estimates of the persistence of the government
spending process (ρ and φ1) are very similar across all specifications. So too is the impact response
12Parameter values used in table (3) reflect commonly chosen values elsewhere in the literature.
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of the tax rates following the spending shock (θgk and θgn). The persistence coefficients in the tax
rules do vary somewhat, although these estimates still produce impulse responses generally within
the empirical confidence intervals.
In all cases the strength of the wealth effect on labour supply is estimated to be low. This
mirrors findings by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010). Furthermore, note that the loss increases
significantly when γ is forced to be one, the case of King-Plosser-Rebelo-type preferences. The
degree of price stickiness is estimated to be high across all specifications, suggesting an important
role for short-run demand effects. However, when other mechanisms are turned off — notably
variable capital utilisation — the degree of price stickiness becomes implausibly high. It is also
interesting to note that the flexible price model (where η = 0) does not perform too badly (in terms
of loss). This, however, relies on an implausibly high level of variable capital utilisation and strong
habit persistence. Similarly, estimates of the habit persistence parameter increase significantly
when sticky prices or variable capital utilisation are turned off. In general, the parameter estimates
governing variable capital utilisation and the investment adjustment costs, κ and µ, are far too
low. These experiments did not, therefore, resolve the issues with the investment response discussed
earlier.
These exercises confirm several important results. Firstly, that the strength of wealth effect
on labour supply is robustly low across all specifications. Secondly, that the strength of the tax
rate response to government spending shocks is limited. And, thirdly, all the model’s mechanisms
appear important for matching the empirical evidence: the baseline case achieves the smallest loss.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have empirically investigated the importance of the endogenous tax response to
government spending shocks and the strength of the wealth effect channel in the United States.
The estimated model matches well the empirical effects of an increase in government spending,
with parameter estimates largely in line with those estimated elsewhere in the literature.
The mix of tax policy instruments matters greatly for the sign and magnitude of key responses.
For example, greater use of labour income taxes causes a contraction in output, consumption, the
real wage and hours, all contrary to the empirical evidence presented in section 2.
Furthermore, the degree of distortionary tax finance interacts with the strength of the wealth
effect on labour supply, which can partially offset any negative substitution effects. By employing
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preferences, I showed that the neoclassical model with a low wealth
20
effect on labour supply fails to match the output, consumption, real wage or hours responses found
in the data. The presence of sticky prices, however, allows the model to qualitatively match all
the empirical responses. The model also contains more standard features such as variable capital
utilisation, investment adjustment costs and habits. All these played a role in replicating the
empirical evidence. I showed how these mechanisms interact and this motivated estimation of the
parameters governing their strength. This is particularly important given that there is little, if any,
a priori information for calibrating the tax rules or the strength of the wealth effect.
The key findings that allow the estimated model to replicate the empirical impulse responses
are, first, that the wealth effect on labour supply is estimated to be small. This casts further
doubt on whether a simple neoclassical model can replicate the empirical evidence. Second, sticky
prices, variable capital utilisation, investment adjustment costs and habits were all found to play an
important role, with parameter values generally in line with those found in the wider literature. One
exception is the parameter governing the investment adjustment costs. Typical calibrations of this
parameter would have implied a larger fall in investment than was observed in the empirical results.
My results suggest that further work should be done to investigate the response of investment
following a government spending shock. Third, I find that while distortionary tax rates rise following
the spending shock, their magnitudes are modest. Importantly, capital tax rates increase more than
labour tax rates, limiting the contractionary effect on output and consumption. The model also
implies a realistic debt path on the basis of these tax rate changes, implying that government
spending shocks — at least over the short to medium-term horizon — tend to be debt-financed.
To the extent that nominal rigidities allow for short-run demand effects and, to the extent that
the wealth effect on labour supply is small, my results suggest that debt-financed (or lump sum tax
financed) government spending shocks will stimulate output, consumption, hours and the real wage
over the short term. The output multiplier was around one. However, the decline in investment
is important as it lowers the economy’s longer-term output and wealth. Furthermore, the required
current and future tax increases place a welfare cost on the economy, even if consumption and
output rise initially. The short-term gain of a spending stimulus then has to be traded-off against
the long-term costs. Striking this balance clearly remains hugely topical in the current climate.
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7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
α 0.3 Capital share
δ 0.025 Steady state depreciation
τK 0 Steady state capital tax rate (from sample)
τN 0 Steady state labour tax rate (from sample)
N 0.2 Steady state labour
G
Y 0.2 Steady state share of government spending
B
Y 1.6 Steady state debt to GDP ratio (quarterly)
σ 1 Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution (γ = 1)
ξ 1.8 Parameter governing Frisch elasticity of labour supply (γ = 0)
φpi 1.5 Coefficient on inflation in the monetary policy rule
ρ 0.8 Autoregressive parameter on at shock
η 0.75 Probability of having a fixed price
κ 0.15 Parameter governing capital utilisation
µ 1/3 Parameter governing the investment adjustment costs
γ 0.01 Parameter governing the wealth effect
h 0.5 Parameter governing habit persistence
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Table 2: Estimated parameter values
Parameter Estimation Description
ρ 0.94 (0.02) Persistence of shock process
φ1 0.00 (0.08) Persistence of spending process
φ2 -0.14 (0.06) Effect of shock on spending
θgn 0.0043 (0.02) Contemporaneous response of the labour tax rate
θgk 0.0046 (0.002) Contemporaneous response of the capital tax rate
θτ
N,1
0.19 (0.1) Labour tax rate AR(1) coefficient
θτ
K,1
1.87 (0.07) Capital tax rate AR(1) coefficient
θτ
N,2
0.038 (0.1) Labour tax rate AR(2) coefficient
θτ
K,2
-0.91 (0.07) Capital tax rate AR(2) coefficient
γ 0.0023 (0.003) Strength of the wealth effect
h 0.58 (0.06) Strength of habits
η 0.86 (0.04) Probability of a fixed price
κ 0.16 (0.33) Governs capital utilisation
µ 0.032 (0.03) Governs investment adjustment costs
Loss 51.52
Table 4: Data sources
Series Source Description
Gov. spending BEA Gov. cons. expenditures and gross inv. (CVM)
Capital taxes BEA Constructed as above
Labour taxes BEA Constructed as above
Output BEA Gross domestic product (CVM)
Real wage BLS BLS Series ID: PRS85006153
Hours Unpublished BLS Francis-Ramey “Measures of Hours per Capita”
Consumption BEA Personal consumption expenditures (CVM)
Investment BEA Gross private domestic investment (CVM)
Debt Treasury Bulletin Close to ‘Debt Held by the Public’
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Figure 1: Impulse responses for the fiscal policy variables
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Figure 2: Impulse responses for key macroeconomic variables
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Figure 3: A simple Neoclassical model: η = 0, γ = 1, κ =∞, h = 0
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Figure 4: A simple Neoclassical model (but no wealth effect): η = 0, γ = 0, κ =∞, h = 0
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Figure 5: Including sticky prices: η = 0.7
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Figure 6: Including variable capital utilization: κ = 0.15
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Figure 7: Including habits: h = 0.5
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Figure 8: Distortionary labour and capital tax rates respond
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Figure 9: Only the labour income tax rate responds
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Figure 10: Only the capital tax rate responds
37
Government Spending
0 5 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Labour taxes
0 5 10
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Capital taxes
0 5 10
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Debt
0 5 10
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Figure 11: Responses of the fiscal variables given the parameter estimates
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Figure 12: Responses of the other variables given the parameter estimates
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Appendices
A Data Appendix
The data span the period 1955:1 to 2007:4. Real government spending, real consumption, real
investment and real GDP come directly from the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA tables. All
variables are the log of real per capita variables. Nominal variables are deflated by their own
implicit price deflators with the exception of government spending which is deflated by the GDP
deflator. Real hours are an unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) series, downloadable
from Valerie Ramey’s website. The real wage is real hourly compensation, non-farm business, in
logs from the BLS. Population is total civilian population also from the BLS.
Real per capita debt is the log of my constructed debt measure divided by the total population
and the GDP deflator. The debt measure is very close the ‘Debt Held by the Public’. This series
is only available from 1970, so I construct a proxy from old editions of the United States Treasury
Bulletin back to 1947. For the pre-1974 period this is the ‘Total Public Issues’ series. After 1974,
for consistency, I have to construct the ‘Total Public Issues’ series from the Monthly Statement of
Public Debt by combining ‘Total Interest Bearing Debt’ minus the ‘Government Accounts Series’
plus ‘Total Treasury Deposit Funds’. Because this is not an exact match to ‘Debt Held by the
Public’ I check how close the two measures are (for the common part of the series, 1970 onwards)
— the R squared is 0.999, so I am confident that my constructed series reflects changes in ‘Debt
Held By the Public’.
The capital and labour income tax rates are constructed following Jones (2002). I reconstruct
the series, extend it back to 1947 following Burnside et al. (2004) and forward to 2008. As a check,
I reproduce the narrative Vector Autoregression results in Burnside et al. (2004), the results are
very similar. These extra results are available on request.
B Linearized models
B.1 Notation
Lower case letters represent the percentage deviation of each variable from its steady state value.
The only exceptions are the tax rates τNt and τ
K
t which are expressed as percentage point deviations
to match the variable definition in the VAR.
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B.2 The consumer’s conditions
B.2.1 Households
a1ct + a2nt + a3xt + a4xt−1 + a5µt − a6λt + a7ct−1 = 0 (43)
λt + wt − 1
1− τN τ
N
t = b1ct + b2nt + b3xt + b4ct−1 (44)
c1ct + c2nt + c3xt + c6ct−1 + µµt = c4µt+1 + c5ct+1 (45)
Etλt+1 = λt − rt (46)
(1− h)xt = (1− h)(1− γ)xt−1 + γct − hγct−1 (47)
µqt − (1 + β)it + it−1 − βEtit+1 = 0 (48)
where µ = 1φ′′ .
qt + rt = r
K(1− τK)βEtrKt+1 − βrKEtτKt+1 + β(1− δ)Etqt+1 − βδ′(z)zEtzt+1 (49)
where the coefficients are given at the end of this appendix.
B.3 Firms
Up to a first order approximation the aggregate production function is given by
yt = αzt + αkt + (1− α)nt (50)
and factors are paid
rKt = mct + yt − kt (51)
wt = mct + yt − nt. (52)
Utilisation is described by
(1 + κ)zt = yt − kt − qt +mct − 1
1− τK τ
K
t (53)
where ξ = δ
′′
δ′ .
Price evolution is determined by the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
pit = βEtpit+1 +
(1− η)(1− βη)
η
mct. (54)
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B.4 Policy rules
rt − Etpit+1 = φpipit (55)
τnt = θ
gngt + θ
bnbt + θ
n1τnt−1 + θ
n2τnt−2 (56)
τkt = θ
gkgt + θ
bkbt + θ
k1τkt−1 + θ
k2τnt−2 (57)
gt = φ1gt−1 + φ2at (58)
T
Y
Tˆt =
B
Y
1
R
(bt+1 + rt)− B
Y
bt =
G
Y
gt − ατn(τnt + nt + wt)− (1− α)τk(τkt + rkt + kt). (59)
B.5 Identities
δit = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (60)
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt. (61)
B.6 Stochastic processes
at+1 = ρat + t+1 (62)
The 3 predetermined variables are:
{bt, kt, at}
and the control variables are:
{ct, pit, wt, nt, xt, yt, rkt ,mct, qt, zt, λt, µt, rt, τKt , τNt , gt, it}
B.7 Coefficients from the linearized Jaimovich–Rebelo preferences
a1 = (γ − 1)µγX1−γ(C(1− h))γ−2C − σCχ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−1
a2 = ξψN
ξXσ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1
a3 = ψN
ξXσ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1
a4 = (1− γ)µγX1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1
a5 = µγX
1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1
a6 = µγX
1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1 + χ
a7 = −ha1
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b1 = −(σψN ξ−ξX((C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1)C)/(a6W (1− τN ))
b2 = ((ξ − 1)ψXN ξ−1ξχ+ σψ2N2ξ−1ξ2X2(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1)/(a6W (1− τN ))
b3 = X(ψN
ξ−1ξχ+ ψN ξ−1ξX(σ((C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1)ψN ξ))/(a6W (1− τN ))
b4 = −hb1
c1 = −σψN ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1C + h(1− γ)µβγ(C(1− h))γ−1X−γC
c2 = ψ
2ξXσN2ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1 + ξψN ξχ
c3 = σψ
2N2ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1X + γµβ(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ
c4 = µβ(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ
c5 = γµβ(1− γ)(C(1− h))γ−1X−γC
c6 = σhψN
ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1C
χ = (C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ
C Steady state
Our assumptions of φ(I/K) imply that
I
K
= δ
therefore
I
Y
=
I
K
K
Y
= δ
K
Y
.
Given the tax and subsidy on revenue (mc = 1), the state version of the return on capital implies
rK = α
Y
K
.
From equation (14)
rK =
R− 1 + δ
1− τK (63)
therefore
K
Y
=
α
rK
(64)
and
I
Y
=
δα
rK
. (65)
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The share of consumption can be written
C
Y
= 1− δK
Y
− G
Y
, (66)
This follows from the resource constraint, equation (23).
ψ can be found by solving the household’s steady state first order conditions
ψ =
(
N ξ
[
ξX
W (1− τN )N −
γX1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1
β(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ − 1
])−1
(67)
where N is steady state hours and is calibrated.
From the production function and the marginal product of capital is
K =
(
rK
α
)( 1α−1)
N, (68)
and dividing the resource constraint by K gives an expression for CK. Using this together with
equation (68) yields an expression for steady state consumption. The steady state real wage follows
from
W = (1− α)
(
K
N
)α
. (69)
µ is the steady state Lagrange multiplier
µ =
ψN ξχ
β(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ − 1 . (70)
From equation (8), steady state X is given by:
X = C(1− h). (71)
The steady state gross real interest rate is related to the discount factor
R =
1
β
. (72)
From the first order condition for zt
δ′(z)z = (1− τK)αY
K
. (73)
B
Y is calibrated.
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